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ARGUMENT 
I. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's refusal to 
formally bifurcate the reception of evidence at the custody hearing relating to 
a change in circumstances and best interest of the parties' child. 
In Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (1982), the Utah Supreme Court adopted a 
bifurcated procedure for determining issues of custody mocfification. In the first step, the 
court must make a finding on the issue of change in circumstances. Id, at 54. If such a 
change is found, "either as a continuation of the same hearing, or in a separate hearing, 
[the court] will proceed to the second step." IcL (emphasis added). Only then shall the 
court consider "evidence relevant to the welfare or best interest of the child." Id 
In Becker v. Becker, the Utah Supreme Court clarified any "confusion [that] 
continue[d] to exist regarding the first step [in the Hogge Analysis]." 694 P.2d 608, 610 
(Utah 1984). More specifically, the Becker court held that: "In the initial step, the court 
will receive evidence only as to the nature and materia\lity of any changes in those 
circumstances upon which the earlier award of custody was based." Id. (emphasis 
added). This holding is conspicuously absent from Respondent's brief. 
The Becker court thus established a bright-line rule in applying the Hogge 
analysis. Notably, Becker involved the review of a custody order that had been entered 
after a full trial. See id., at 609. Subsequent Utah cases Jiave reaffinned Becker. For 
instance, in Stevens v. Collard, the Utah Court of Appeals Stated that: "[W]hile parties to 
previously litigated custody cases may not introduce evidepce of a change's effect on a 
child's best interest in order the satisfy the threshold requirement of the Hogge-Becker 
test, those in previously non-litigated cases may offer such 'best interest' evidence during 
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both prongs of the Hogge analysis." 837 P.2d 593, 596 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In this 
case, it is undisputed that custody was litigated at the divorce trial in December 2004. 
Respondent relies heavily upon Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah 1987), to 
support her contention that "a rigid application of the change circumstances requirement" 
should not be applied in this case. (Respondent's Br., at 18). Respondent's reliance is 
misplaced. First, Kramer is not factually on point. In that case, the custody decree was 
based upon stipulation. See id., at 625. Second, Respondent relies upon language found 
in a concurring opinion. See Kramer, 738 P.2d at 628 (Durham, J., concurring). As 
such, it is not binding precedent. Third, Kramer addressed the issue of whether a change 
in circumstance analysis should focus on the custodial or non-custodial parent far more 
than it addressed the procedure for receiving evidence under Hogge-Becker. 
Nevertheless, the Court's analysis of that issue weighs strongly in favor of Mr. Doyle's 
position: "The narrow construction we place on Hogge is not an innovation or a change 
in our case law. Rather, it is consistent with the approach this Court implicitly has taken 
in applying the first prong of Hogge's change of custody test." Id, at 627. Kramer thus 
suggests that the Hogge-Becker rule should be strictly applied. 
Kramer was decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1987. Two years later, the 
Utah Court of Appeals interpreted Kramer in Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). After providing a detailed history of the Utah case law on this issue 
(including the concurring opinions in Kramer), the Maughn court concluded: 
Our reading of Hogge and its progeny suggests that on a petition for 
custody modification, trial courts should carefully scrutinize the 
facts behind the original award of custody. If the initial award was 
? 
based on a through examination by the trial court of the various 
factors pertaining to the child's welfare, a rigid application of the 
change-in-circumstances prong is in order. In such a case, the court 
has already considered the best interests of the child and made a 
determination consistent with that finding. 
Maughn, 770 P.2d at 160 (emphasis added). 
Respondent also relies upon Elmer v. Elmer, 776 |\2d 599 (Utah 1989), and its 
progeny to support her contention that complete bifurcation was not required in the 
instant case. (See Respondent's Br., at 19-20). Respondent's reliance is again misplaced. 
In Elmer, the Utah Supreme Court slightly modified the Hogge-Becker test. Elmer 
allows for introduction of some "best interest" evidence during the "change in 
circumstances" phase of the modification hearing in those limited situations where the 
question of the child's best interest have not been subject to an objective appraisal on the 
merits (i.e., where the existing custody arrangement is the result of a stipulation or 
default). See Elmer, 776 P.2d at 605; see also Stevens, 837 P.2d at 596. The reason for 
this relaxation of the bright-line rule is that, where custody has not been previously 
adjudicated, "the res judicata policy underlying the changed-circumstances rule is at a 
particularly low ebb." Elmer, 776 P.2d at 603. 
Likewise, neither Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT App. 283, 191 P.3d 1242, nor Walton 
v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), supports Respondent's position. As in 
Elmer, both of these cases were based upon custody decrees entered into by stipulation. 
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Both of these also cases expressly held that Elmer's tempering of the Hogge-Becker rule 
applied only to non-litigated cases. This, again, due to res judicata concerns.1 
In sum, the Respondent has not cited a single Utah case in which complete 
bifurcation was not required in the modification of a litigated custody decree. In fact, 
there appear to be none. Hogge, Becker, Kramer, Stevens, and Maughn all require strict 
application of the bright line rule - and thus, complete bifurcation. Elmer, Walton, and 
Huish are simply not on point. For this reason alone, the Court of Appeals was in error 
and should be reversed. 
Respondent also contends that Mr. Doyle was not prejudiced by the trial court's 
error. (See Respondent's Br., at 21-22). This is simply not true. It is undisputed that the 
trial court heard best interest evidence before entering its "preliminary" finding on 
change of circumstances. Thus, any finding of changed circumstances was tainted ab 
initio - and the trial court was prevented from objectively ruling on this issue. 
Furthermore, the "preliminary" finding was also defective because the trial court reached 
the same before Mr. Doyle had an opportunity to present evidence. Each of these 
arguments are more fully set forth in Petitioner's initial brief. (See Petitioner's Br., at 22-
23). 
Both Huish and Walton are fully discussed and analyzed in Petitioner's initial 
brief- and thus, in order to avoid any unnecessary duplication, will not be set forth here. 
(See Petitioner's Br., at 19-22). That being said, neither of these precedents is applicable 
to the instant case, and the Court of Appeals was in error in relying upon them. 
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Finally, Respondent lists four reasons why this C|)urt should diverge from the 
bright-line application of the Hogge-Becker rule in this ca^e. (See Respondent's Br., at 
22-23). All of these reasons are without merit. 
First, there are simply no unique procedural facts in this case which would justify 
diverting from the bright-line rule. For example, the custody award was not based upon a 
default judgment as in Maughn. Furthermore, as set forth above, Maughn requires a 
"rigid application" of Hogge-Becker in cases (like the present one) where the initial 
custody award was based on a through examination by th^ trial court. Additionally, in 
this case, the trial court was not forced to judge between "marginal custody 
arrangements" or "the lesser of two evils." See Maughfr, 770 P.2d at 160. To the 
contrary. 
On this same note, Respondent maintains that the custody decree should be given 
less weight because "the Judge [presiding over the divorce trial] believed both parents to 
be equally capable of parenting [Hyrum]." (See Respondent's Br., at 9). This reasoning 
is specious. The facts in Becker clearly indicate that the trial judge there found both 
parents fit to be awarded custody. See Becker, 694 P.2d at 609. Nonetheless, the bright-
line rule still applied there. 
Second, Respondent argues that the custody decree should be given less weight 
because it was only in effect for a short time. This reasoning is also specious. The policy 
underlying Utah's high threshold for custody modification i|s "to protect [children] from 
'ping-pong' custody awards and the accompanying instability so damaging to a child's 
proper development." Maughn, 770 P.2d at 160; see also Kramer, 738 P.2d at 626 ("The 
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'change of circumstances' threshold is high to discourage frequent petitions for 
modification of custody decrees."). Giving less weight to custody decrees that have been 
in effect for only a short time would invite petitioners to move for custody modification 
sooner and more readily. This, in turn, would undermine stated Utah policy which 
disfavors an unnecessary drain on judicial resources and encourages stable custodial 
relationships. 
Furthermore, whether Respondent relocated in reliance of the automatic change 
provision is a factual question that goes to substantial and material change - not to 
whether the bright-line rule should be applied in this case. Respondent's third reason for 
diverging from the bright-line rule suffers from this same defect. 
Finally, Kramer is not on point. As fully set forth above, Kramer involved a 
custody decree that was based upon stipulation. Kramer, 738 P.2d at 625. Kramer also 
supports a strict reading and application of the Hogge-Becker rule. Additionally, in 
interpreting Kramer, the Utah Court of Appeals has confirmed that where the custody 
decree followed a trial on the merits, "a rigid application of the change-in-circumstances 
prong is in order." Maughn, 770 P.2d at 160. Such is precisely the case here. 
For each of these reasons, the Court of Appeals was in error. Accordingly, it 
should be reversed and the District Court's Order of Modification vacated. 
II. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's determination 
that a substantial and material change in circumstances justified a 
modification of custody. 
At the outset, Respondent contends that a brief review of the finding upon which 
the Court of Appeals made its determination is in order. (Respondent's Br., at 23). 
Respondent then outlines and summarizes seven points upon which she believes the 
Court of Appeal's determination was based. (Respondent'^ Br., at 23-24). In reply, Mr. 
Doyle contends that each of these seven points was fairly set forth in the "five findings" 
that were addressed in his initial brief. (See Petitioner's Br., at 24-33). Several of the 
Respondent's points are duplicative or overlap one another.1 Moreover, Respondent does 
not appear to take issue with the manner in which Mr. Doyle classified each of the "five 
findings" in his initial brief. Therefore, Mr. Doyle replies t0 the Respondent's arguments 
using this same five-point structure. As to any disagreement on this issue, Mr. Doyle 
maintains that the opinion of the Court of Appeals speaks fo\c itself. 
First, the striking of the "automatic change of custody" provision in the original 
divorce decree did not constitute a change in circumstances. Under Utah law, a petition 
to modify will not be granted unless there was "a change in the circumstances upon 
which the original custody award was based which substantially and materially affect 
that custodial parent's parenting ability or the functioning of the custodial relationship." 
Kramer, 738 P.2d at 625 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the invalidation of the provisiori had no effect on Mr. Doyle 
(the custodial parent) or the functioning of his relationship with Hyrum. It merely struck 
an unlawful provision. Furthermore, the fact that the trial court indicated that "any 
request to modify the custody award must be made by Petition to Modify the Divorce 
Decree," has absolutely no bearing on this issue. (See Respondent's Br., at 25 & 
Appendix II). The trial court was simply indicating that a change in custody could not be 
accomplished by way of Respondent's motion for new trial It was not commenting upon 
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"the significance of [its] decision on the expectation of the parties" - let alone suggesting 
that "but for" this procedural defect a change of custody was warranted. (See id., at 25). 
Second, Respondent's reliance upon the automatic change provision is also 
immaterial. In short, she was not the custodial parent. Likewise immaterial is her 
argument that the original trial court found both parties to be fit parents. (See id., at 26). 
As set forth above, this reasoning is specious. See Becker, 694 P.2d at 609. Moreover, 
these statements (even taken as true) simply have no bearing upon Mr. Doyle's parental 
ability or his relationship with Hyrum. As such, they cannot constitute a substantial or 
material change in circumstance. 
Third, Mr. Doyle's alleged failure to make parental improvements does not 
constitute a change in circumstance. It is legally insufficient because, by definition, it 
does not comprise a "change" from the original decree. Furthermore, any allegedly 
unfulfilled parental improvement anticipated by the original trial court judge does not 
support Respondent's position. Child custody determinations must be based on presently 
existing fact. See Hogge, 649 P.2d at 52. 
Petitioner has not misstated the finding of the lower courts on this point. (See 
Respondent's Br., at 26). In fact, the Court of Appeals opinion expressly stated that "[the 
original judge] clearly anticipated that [Father]'s parenting skills would continue to 
develop . . . ." (See Petitioner's Br., at Appendix B, ^ 16) (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, although the Court of Appeals stated that "the trial court found that since 
the entry of the Divorce Decree . . . Father's parenting skills had not improved," (see id., 
at Tf 17), there was no concomitant finding that Mr. Doyle's parenting had diminished in 
any respect. In short, there was no change in Mr. Doyle's parental ability - let alone a 
substantial and material one that would justify a change in custody. 
Fourth, the Court of Appeals erred in determining t|hat a Hyrum's alleged social 
and academic deterioration constituted a change in circumstances. Respondent has not 
identified any finding that causally links an alleged decrease in Hyrum's performance to 
Mr. Doyle's parenting. In fact, she cannot. Here, Respondent cites Mr. Doyle's 
continued use of corporal punishment as her supporting example. (See Respondent's Br., 
at 26). Yet, this fact goes far more to the improvement of! Mr. Doyle's parenting skills 
(as discussed above), than to any alleged decrease in Hyrum's performance. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Doyle testified at trial that he only spanned Hyrum twice since 2004. 
(Transcript II, at 323). Moreover, Mr. Doyle testified that he spanked Hyrum only once 
on each occasion, that the spanking was mild, and that it was not done out of anger. (Id.). 
This does not constitute continued or excessive reliance upon corporal punishment. 
Likewise, Respondent cites Mr. Doyle's decision to remove Hyrum from special 
education. (Respondent's Br., at 26-27). Here again, however, Respondent's brief is 
silent to the fact that: (a) she was also present when that decision was made (Transcript I, 
at 180, 205-06); (b) Mr. Doyle decided to remove Hyrum from special education because 
he did not believe it was producing results and because he was considering transferring 
Hyrum to another school (Transcript II, at 334, 353-55); ((\) Hyrum's principal did not 
oppose this transfer (id., at 353); (d) Mr. Doyle removed Hyrum in order to begin 
working with him at home (id, at 395); (e) Hyrum's teacher believed he was getting 
good at getting his work done at home (Transcript I, at 158); (f) Dr. Kingston - Hyrum's 
9 
therapist - also related that Hyrum was making academic progress because of changes in 
his home environment (id, at 91-92); and, (g) Dr. Hale - the court appointed custody 
evaluator - did not believe that Dr. Kingston had recommended that Hyrum continue in 
special education (id., at 105-06). 
In short, Respondent has never met her burden of proof on this issue. It is not 
enough for a party simply to show that a child has underperformed. Rather, the moving 
party must demonstrate that the custodial parent's abilities or the custodial relationship 
has materially and substantially changed. Kramer, 738 P.2d at 625. This has not been 
shown in the instant case. 
Nor has Respondent identified any finding that establishes a baseline for Hyrum's 
abilities - without which no change can be measured. See, e j^ , Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989) ("The [trial court's factual] findings 
must be articulated with sufficient detail so that the basis of the ultimate conclusion can 
be understood."). It is undisputed that Hyrum had special needs. Therefore, such a 
baseline is all the more necessary in this case. Respondent's brief avoids this argument 
altogether. 
In addition, Respondent has not addressed the important policy concerns that arise 
in this case. Allegations that a special needs child is experiencing academic or social 
difficulty (even if taken as true), may relate to a wide variety of factors unrelated to the 
custodial relationship. In such cases, clear factual findings linking diminished 
performance to parenting are all the more critical. Without these, special needs children 
run a greater risk of having the custodial relationship disturbed. 
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Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that Hyrum was 
deteriorating both academically and socially. Contrary to Respondent's assertion, this 
evidence was not undisputed at trial. (See Respondent's Br., at 26). Rather, there was 
evidence that Hyrum was improving in some areas - much of which has been specifically 
set forth above. (See also Petitioner's Br., at 29-30). Once more, Respondent's brief has 
failed to address this evidence altogether. 
Fifth and finally, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Mr. Doyle had 
attempted to marginalize Ms. Doyle's relationship with Hyrum. This determination is not 
supported by the facts or by Utah law. 
To begin, the alleged interference in this case does not arise to a level which 
would constitute an "extreme circumstance" justifying a change in custody. See Sigg v. 
Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). There has been ho "constant" or "egregious" 
denials of visitation in this case. See id., at 915. To the contrary, Respondent admitted at 
trial that she has never been denied parent time since the custody order was clarified in 
November 2005. (Transcript I, at 30-31). This simple fact Is conspicuously absent from 
her brief- as is any reference to the Sigg case. 
The remaining evidence on this point is likewise insufficient to support a finding 
that Mr. Doyle marginalized Respondent's relationship with her son. With respect to 
excluding her from participating in Hyrum's education (and specifically from the IEP 
conference in March 2005), the evidence presented at trial farther demonstrated that: (a) 
Mr. Doyle was not aware Respondent was coming from Denver to attend the conference 
until that very day (Transcript II, at 380); (b) Mr. Doyle had invited her to all future 
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conferences (id., at 384); and, (c) Mr. Doyle had voluntarily provided her with all of 
Hyrum's school records (id., at 360). In addition, there was no evidence presented that 
Respondent had ever been excluded from any other educational events or academic 
decisions. 
Lastly, Respondent states that "even the expert witness [Dr. Hale] concluded that 
Mr. Doyle's acts or interference in marginalizing the father/mother relationship [sic] were 
sincere and purposeful." (Respondent's Br., at 27). Here, it is the Respondent who is 
misstating the facts. Indeed, Dr. Hale specifically testified that Hyrum did not exhibit 
any signs of a child suffering from parental alienation. (See Transcript I, at 219). 
For each of these reasons, the Court of Appeals was in error and should be 
reversed. Likewise, the Order of Modification should be vacated. 
III. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's modification of 
child support based on Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Although Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) permits relief on grounds not 
pleaded, that rule does not go so far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues neither 
raised nor tried. Combe v. Warren's Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984). 
"In law or equity, a judgment must be responsive to the issues framed by the pleadings, 
and a trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented for 
determination." Id., at 736. If an issue is to be tried and a party's rights concluded with 
respect thereto, he must have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet it. Buehner 
Block Co. v.Glezos, 310 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1957). 
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 Petitioner presumes that the Respondent is here referring to the alleged 
interference of her relationship with Hyrum by Mr. Doyle. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that Respondent did not include a request for 
child support in her Petition to Modify. It is also undisputbd that no evidence regarding 
child support was received at trial. Rather, this issue was not raised until after trial -
when Respondent submitted a proposed order which included a modification of child 
support provision. Mr. Doyle timely objected to the same. (See Record, at 1650-54). 
On March 19, 2008, the trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on Mr. Doyle's 
objection. It is undisputed that no testimony was given at this time. Rather, at that time, 
the trial court merely ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of 
whether child support modification was appropriate in this case. (Id., at 1794-95). Mr. 
Doyle timely complied with that order. (See id., at 1798-1810). Thereafter, the trial 
court issued an order awarding Respondent child support - as determined by the statutory 
child support guidelines. (See Petitioner's Br., Appendix D,|at *f 10). 
Respondent is correct in asserting that the issue of 4hild support in this case was 
complex and involved the issue of Hyrunfs receipt of SS|DI disability benefits. (See 
Respondent's Br., at 29). In fact, the vast majority of both parties' supplement briefs are 
dedicated to addressing this specific legal issue. (See Record, at 1798-1810; 1826-46). 
Respondent is also correct in noting that both parties had filed financial declarations 
during the course of the proceedings. (See Respondent's Bjr., at 30). Nevertheless, the 
trial court erred in awarding child support to the Respondent. The Court of Appeals 
likewise erred in upholding this decision. 
Under Utah law, the child support guidelines are to be applied as rebuttable 
presumptions. Thus, Mr. Doyle was entitled to put o^ i evidence to rebut those 
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presumptions by showing that "an award amount resulting from use of the guidelines 
would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of the child in a particular case." 
UTAH CODE §78B-12-210(3). Mr. Doyle was denied this opportunity. 
Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in asserting that child support should 
"follow the child," Mr. Doyle still should have been given the opportunity meet this 
challenge. Under Utah law, a trial court is required by statute to make a number of 
factual findings when establishing or modifying child support. See, e.g., UTAH CODE 
§78B-12-210. This was not, as the trial court defined it, "a purely legal issue." (See 
Record, at 1984). Rather, it directly touched upon factual issues and made a 
determination upon Mr. Doyle's legal rights. Supplemental briefing was, therefore, not 
sufficient. Legal arguments are simply not evidence. 
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals should be reversed. The District Court's 
Order of Modification should also be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
For each of these reasons, the Court of Appeals was in error. Accordingly, Mr. 
Doyle respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals be reversed. Further, because there 
was no showing on the record of a substantial and material change in circumstances, Mr. 
Doyle requests that the District Court's Order of Modification be vacated. 
Notably, the trial court also erred in determining the amount of child support due 
under the Utah Code. The Court of Appeals, thus, reversed and remanded on this issue. 
(See Petitioner's Br., at 33 n.6.). 
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2009 
(eve S. Christ; 
Matt Ande/son 
Benjamin Lusty 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Douglas Doyle 
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